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We show that xed exchange rate regimes are preferred for high enough labor supply
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1 Introduction
Since Friedman (1953), the international and monetary economics literature has widely studied
the transmission of international shocks within the production sector. Accordingly, the adoption
of a pegging policy or a common currency union shifts most adjustments to the real side of the
economy. Flexible exchange rates, on the other hand, correct relative price misalignments and
absorb macroeconomic shocks. Adjustments on the real side of the economy consist not only of
the expansion and contraction of existing rmsproduction - intensive margins -, but also the
entry and exit of rms - extensive margins. The choice of xed or exible exchange rate regimes
is therefore likely to be a¤ected by the way those margins respond to shocks. While previous
literature has mainly focused on the role of intensive margins on this choice, the present paper
aims to study the role of extensive margins and to compare them with the literature.
This paper discusses the costs and benets of xed and exible exchange rate regimes in
a general equilibrium model that includes two countries, money holdings, elastic labor supply,
stochastic exogenous demand shocks and endogenous intensive and extensive margins. Firms
produce and sell di¤erentiated products under monopolistic competition. They enter or exit by
comparing operational prots with costs of entry. Wages are assumed to be sticky for one period.
Under such nominal rigidities, money has a role in the economy beyond a mere unit of account.
Thus, monetary policy may have an impact on both extensive as well as intensive margins.
Without any state-contingent nancial assets internationally held, the choice of exchange rate
regimes becomes critical for welfare.
Accepting closed form solutions, the model allows us to discuss the e¤ect of asymmetrical
demand shocks on intensive and extensive margins and on the choice of exchange rate regimes.
We then study two repeated entry models where rms enter at every time period. In the
rst model, rms enter and incur a xed cost investment in the same period as they produce
(contemporaneous production). In the second model , rms must enter and invest one period
in advance to their production period (lagged production). In this case, consumer may nd an
alternative to money saving by lending their funds to rms while there may exist a discrepancy
between shock realizations and product supply realizations.
We can preview our results are as follows. In general, the loss of the exchange rate instrument
requires adjustments in extensive as well as intensive margins following demand shocks. First,
when entry is contemporaneous to production, adjustments arise only in extensive margins and
in the xed exchange rate system. Extensive margins are procyclical and imply lower levels and
higher volatility in extensive margins. Yet, such procyclical movements in extensive margins
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raise welfare because they occur at the very moment of the demand shifts. The choice of a xed
exchange rate regime must therefore account for its costs (the lower mean level of and higher
variability in extensive margins) and its benets (the stronger congruence between preference
and product diversity). These costs decrease with higher labor supply elasticities. Second,
when rms enter and invest before they produce, both margins uctuate under xed exchange
rates. Intensive margins uctuate according to the current demand shocks while extensive
margins vary with one period of lag. The changes in intensive margins leads to consumption
levels that are congruent with demands, which benets consumers. However, the volatility in
extensive margins reduces consumerswelfare. As in the contemporaneous entry model, we
show that xed exchange rate regimes are preferable for high enough labor supply elasticities.
More importantly, we also show that xed exchange rate regimes are supported for a smaller
set of parameters when production is lagged behind investment. This is further the case when
consumers express a higher preference for product diversity. The extensive margin volatility
has indeed a higher impact on householdswelfare when they attach a higher importance to
product diversity. In those two models, extensive margins always operate as a shock absorber
that substitute for exchange rates (in a perfect or imperfect way respectively in the rst or
second model).
In this paper, there is neither international borrowing and lending nor scal transfer.1 Risk
sharing across countries is therefore imperfect and the exible price allocation realized under
exible exchange rate regimes deviates from that obtained under complete asset markets.2
The Pareto e¢ cient allocation would have the product supply and diversity set according to
changes in the tastes for each countrys products and would balance those margins e¢ ciently
across countries. However, although exible exchange rates correct relative prices and realize
higher average production and lower volatility, they fail to ensure that product supply and
diversity align with consumer demands. By contrast, xed exchange rate regimes have the
opposite properties.
Our contribution relates to the literature in the following way. First of all, our model and
results can be compared with Devereuxs (2004) contribution qualifying the prevailing view that
1This corresponds to situations where governments are unable to organize signicant transfers between
countries and where households and/or governments are unable to use the international credit market in the
long run because of various borrowing constraints (e.g. credit constraints for households, Maastricht treaty for
E.U. countries, I.M.F. constraints for developing countries). The 2011 Greece-EU crisis is a good illustration of
the di¢ culties of organizing international transfers and access to credit markets.
2The deviation is called a "demand imbalance" in the literature (Corsetti et al. 2010a, 2010b). See also
Hamano (2009a, 2009b) for related topics of risk sharing and extensive margins.
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exchange rates are the most important shock absorbers. Discussing a static economy with two
countries, two varieties, wage rigidities and constant returns to scale, Devereux shows that xed
exchange rates improve welfare compared to exible ones when the elasticity of labor supply is
su¢ ciently high. Our model extends this model to full dynamics, increasing returns to scale,
monopolistic competition and the entry and exit of rms. The extension allows us to discuss
the role of the balance between intensive and extensive margins in welfare ranking. Comparing
results, it turns out that, when production and investment occur in the same time period, the
choice of an exchange rate regime is the same in Devereux (2004) as our model. The forces at
play are, however, di¤erent since product substitutability and love of product diversity drive
the welfare e¤ects of extensive margins in this paper. Our results di¤er when rms invest in
advance to production. This paper also presents and discusses a formal decomposition of the
welfare contribution of the two margins.
The present paper emphasizes the mechanisms through which intensive and extensive mar-
gins can be accountable for the choice of exchange rate regimes. Our approach contrasts with
the classical literature, where rmsentry is driven solely by "real factors" such as productiv-
ity and population shocks (Krugman 1980, 1991; Melitz 2003; Ghironi and Melitz 2005). In
this instance, Naknoi (2008a, 2008b)s contribution is very close to ours. Naknoi analyzes how
exchange rate regimes impact extensive margins through endogenous tradability based on a Ri-
cardian comparative advantage.3 While relocation of rms between tradable and non-tradable
sectors arises in her model, our model accommodates free entry conditions and exporting by all
rms. Because the sectorial relocation of rms is instantaneous in Naknois model, there exists
no welfare cost that could arise from the mismatch between taste and product diversity under
xed exchange rate regimes. Baldwin and Nino (2006) and Bergin and Lin (2010) also look
at the impact of a common currency on extensive margins. They, however, attach a special
role to xed costs and abstract away from monetary issues. Finally, our paper builds upon the
so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics (see, for instance, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1995,
Corsetti et al. 2010b). While this literature has focused on optimal monetary policies under
complete nancial markets, it is beginning to investigate those policies under incomplete nan-
cial markets, as we do in this paper. This approach is also followed by Ching (2003) and Picard
and Worrall (2009), who consider monetary transfers within currency unions that correct for
the incompleteness of nancial markets.
3Interaction between extensive margins and monetary policy has been investigated in a closed economy. See
for instance, Bergin and Corsetti (2008), Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007), Lewis (2009) and Bilbiie, Fujiwara
and Ghironi (2011).
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the model and discuss
the equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the case where rms enter, invest and produce in the same
time period. Section 5 studies the case with production lags. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The present model discusses the welfare costs and benets of exchange rate regimes between
two countries, Home and Foreign. (Foreign variables are denoted with asterisks.) Each country
is inhabited by a unit mass of households who are di¤erentiated only in terms of their labor
services. Wages are set by households one period in advance of production. There are no scal
transfers and no borrowing and lending across countries. We describe the domestic country
(Home). The same description holds for Foreign.
Households In every time period t, each household i 2 [0; 1] consumes goods in a domestic
set Xt and a foreign set Zt of di¤erentiated varieties. It also holds a quantity of moneyMt (i) and
supplies lt (i) labor units (worked hours). The household maximizes its expected intertemporal
utility, E0
P1
t=0 
tUt where  2 (0; 1) is a common discount rate and where utility in period t
is given by the following two-tier utility function:
Ut (i) = lnCt (i) +  ln
Mt (i)
Pt
   [lt (i)]
1+ 
1 +  
where
Ct (i) =

Xt (i)
t
t  Zt (i)
1  t
t
and
Xt (i) = N
  1
 1
t
Z
!2Xt
xt (i; !)
 1
 d!
 
 1
and Zt (i) = N
  1
 1
t
Z
2Zt
zt (i; )
 1
 d
 
 1
In this denition, Pt is the consumer price index, and Mt (i) =Pt is household is real money
holding. The parameter  measures the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply while
the parameters  and  measure the intensity of preferences towards real money holdings
and individual labor supply (worked hours) respectively. We call Ct (i) the composite bundle
and Xt (i) and Zt (i) the consumption baskets of domestic and foreign product. While xt (i; !)
denotes its consumption of domestic varieties ! 2 Xt, zt (i; ) denotes the consumption of foreign
varieties  2 Zt. Nt and Nt denotes the mass of domestic and foreign varieties. Under the
above preferences, the parameter  > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution among varieties
within the same consumption basket while   0 measures the preference (love) for product
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diversity within each consumption basket (Benassy 1996).4 The breakdown between product
substitution and love for variety will be important in the discussion of the welfare impact of
intensive and extensive margins. Finally, the parameters (t; t ) where 

t  1   t 2 (0; 1)
measures the preference between the two consumption baskets. Following Devereux (2004), we
will consider that the economy is hit by demand shocks so that t follows an i.i.d. stochastic
process which is symmetrically distributed around a mean equal to 1=2.
A Home household supplies its labor and earns an income wt(i)lt(i) where wt(i) is its hourly
wage. In addition to spending its income on the above product varieties and holding money, the
household can invest in domestic rms. We consider two models. In the rst, rm investment
and entry occur in the same time period so that m = 0. In the second, investment occurs
one period before entry as a result of share holding choice by households -that is m = 1. The
household can therefore invest in a rm that produces the variety ! 2 Xt+m that become
available either within the same period (m = 0) or within the next period (m = 1). The
household budget constraint is then given byZ
!2Xt
pt (!)xt (i; !) d! +
Z
2Zt
pt () zt (i; ) d +
Z
!2Xt+m
st (i; !) qt (!) d! +Mt(i)
= wt(i)lt(i) +
Z
!2Xt
st m (i; !) dt (!) d! +Mt 1(i)
where pt (!) and pt () are the (domestic) prices of Home and Foreign varieties ! 2 Xt and
 2 Zt. In this expression qt (!) denotes the price at date t for a share of a rm that enters at
date t and produces variety ! 2 Xt+m at date t+m, while dt (!) denotes the dividend paid by
an incumbent producer ! 2 Xt at period t. Household i spends a share st (i; !) on the stock
of an entering rm ! 2 Xt+m and receives the share st m (i; !) of the dividend paid by every
incumbent producer ! 2 Xt.
Firms Firms activities are described as follows. Consider a Home rm that produces a
di¤erentiated variety ! 2 Xt under increasing returns to scale and sells its products under
monopolistic competition at date t. We assume that to produce its output the rm must spend
on "establishment" activities (e.g. building a production plant) at the time period t m where
m = 0; 1. Every rm employs a set of horizontally di¤erentiated labor services. To make
this more precise, we assume that each household i 2 [0; 1] o¤ers a di¤erentiated labor service
and that every rm ! demands the quantities of labor services `t (i; !) and et (i; !), for its
4The parameter  is equal to zero when consumers express no love for variety and to 1=(   1) when they
have the preference for product variety that is assumed in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
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production and setup activities, respectively. To produce yt (!) units of outputs, the rm uses
the set of labor services given by
yt (!) =
Z 1
0
`t (i; !)
1  1
 di
 1
1  1

(1)
whereas it uses
f =
Z 1
0
et m (i; !)
1  1
 di
 1
1  1

(2)
for its establishment activities at date t m. In those expressions,  > 1 is the elasticity of sub-
stitution among the di¤erent labor services. The rm pays a dividend to its shareholders. This
dividend is equal to the contemporaneous operational prot that includes sales and production
cost:
dt (!) = pt (!) yt (!) 
Z 1
0
`t (i; !)wt(i)di (3)
The setup cost is equal to
R 1
0
et m (i; !)wt m(i)di.
Markets and governments When product markets clear, each rms supply equals the
demand for its variety by both domestic and foreign consumers:
yt (!) =
Z 1
0
xt (!; i) di+
Z 1
0
xt (!; j) dj, ! 2 Xt
where the superscript  denotes foreign consumption and j denotes each foreign household.
Similarly, when labor markets clear, each households labor supply equals the demand by rms:
lt(i) =
Z
!2Xt
`t (i; !) d! +
Z
!2Xt+m
et (i; !) d!, i 2 [0; 1]
In equilibrium, trade must be balanced so that the value of domestic imports equates the value
of exports. We getZ 1
0
Z
2Zt
"tp
 () zt (; i) ddi =
Z 1
0
Z
!2Xt
p (!)xt (!; j) d!dj
where "t is the exchange rate (namely, the price of one unit of foreign money in terms of the
domestic currency), p () is the price of foreign variety  2 Zt denominated in the foreign
currency, and xt (!; j) is the foreign demand for the domestic variety ! 2 Xt.
Finally, the central bank supplies an amount of moneyMt. When the money market clears,
the money supply is equal to its demand so that
Mt =
Z 1
0
Mt (i) di
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Symmetric conditions hold for the foreign country.
Wages are sticky during one time period. We dene the equilibrium as follows: (i) each
household i chooses a plan of money holding fMt(i)g1t=0, consumption proles fxt(i; ); zt(i; )g1t=0,
stock market positions fs (i; )g1t=0 and wages fwt+1(i))g1t=0 applying in the next period, that
maximize its intertemporal utility subject to its per-period budget constraint, (ii) each rm
! 2 Xt chooses its product price pt(!) and its labor demands `t (i; !) and et (i; !) that max-
imizes its prot, (iii) the local stock market clears so that rms enter as long as they raise
a stock price qt(!) that meets future expected dividends and (iv) products, labor and money
markets clear in every period. The money supply is set by each central bank with the objective
of either a xed or exible exchange rate.
3 Equilibrium
We here describe the equilibrium choices by households and rms and determine the market
equilibrium conditions for any exogenous monetary policy. Equilibrium conditions will be
applied to the monetary policies of xed and exible exchange rate regimes in the next sections.
For the sake of conciseness, we here discuss the cases of contemporaneous and lagged production
together, equilibrium conditions being identical or similar. We nish by discussing equilibrium
welfare.
Household choices In period t, the household i chooses its consumption proles (xt(i; ); zt(i; )),
money holding Mt (i) and share holdings st (i). First, its optimal consumption of home and
foreign varieties can be computed as
xt(i; !) = N
( 1) 1
t

pt (!)
PX;t
 
Xt (i) and zt(i; ) = N
( 1) 1
t

pt ()
PZ;t
 
Zt (i)
where
Xt (i) = t
PtCt (i)
PX;t
and Zt (i) = (1  t) PtCt (i)
PZ;t
are the chosen consumption baskets and
PX;t = N
1
 1 
t
Z
!2Xt
pt (!)
1  d!
 1
1 
and PZ;t = N
 1
 1 
t
Z
2Zt
pt ()
1  d
 1
1 
are the price indexes for those baskets. Finally, the consumer price index is given by
Pt = P
t
X;tP
1 t
Z;t
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Second, the households optimal money holdings and share of stock are expressed as the
following real money demand equation.
Mt (i)
Pt
= Ct (i)

1  Ett;t+1 (i) (4)
for m = 0 and 1; where
t;t+1 (i) = 
PtCt (i)
Pt+1Ct+1 (i)
(5)
denotes the endogenous discount rate between t and t+ 1.
While the equilibrium share of stock should be such that stock prices equal dividends
(qt(!) = dt(!)) when m = 0, the optimal share of stock is given by the following Euler equation
when m = 1:
qt (!) = Ett;t+1 (i) dt+1 (!) : (6)
Firmsdecisions Firms produce under monopolistic competition. Consider a rm ! 2 Xt
that chooses its price and labor demand at date t. It maximizes its dividend payment (3) with
respect to pt (!) and `t (; !) subject to the production function (1). The cost-minimizing
demand for labor services is then equal to `t (i; !) = (wt(i)=Wt)
  yt (!) 8i where
Wt 
Z 1
0
wt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
is the wage index, common for all domestic rms. Considering the following iso-elastic demand
for its variety
yt (!) =
Z 1
0
xt(i; !)di+
Z 1
0
xt (j; !)di = N
( 1) 1
t

pt (!)
PX;t
  Z 1
0
Xt (i) di+
Z 1
0
Xt (j) dj

(7)
the rm sets its optimal price
pt (!) =

   1Wt (8)
which is the same for all domestic varieties. Taking into account the above conditions, the
rms dividend is equal to dt = pt (!) yt (!) =.
Firm i also minimizes its setup cost
R 1
0
et m (i; !)wt m(i)di. Its cost-minimizing demand
for labor services is equal to et m (i; !) = (wt m(i)=Wt m)
  f , which results in a cost Wt mf .
Wage setting In this paper we consider wages that are sticky. The households set
their wages one time period in advance. Accordingly, at date t, a domestic household i
sets the wage wt+1(i) that maximizes its expected utility EtUt+1(i) subject to next periods
budget constraint and next periods balance between labor supply and demand: lt+1 (i) =
9
R
!2Xt+1 `t+1 (i; !)dw +
R
!2Xt+1+m et+1 (i; !)dw. In the latter expression, the rst and second
terms respectively represent the labor demands for production activities at date t + 1 and for
setup activities at date t+1 by the rms producing at date t+1+m,m = 0; 1. As seen above, this
labor demand is a iso-elastic function of wt(i). One can show that the household sets its wage
such that its expected disutility of a marginal work e¤ort, wt+1 (i)
 1Etlt+1 (i)
1+ , equals its
expected utility from the associated increase in consumption, (   1)Et [lt+1 (i) = (Pt+1Ct+1 (i))].
Hence,
wt+1 (i) = 

   1
Etlt+1 (i)
1+ 
Et [lt+1 (i) = (Pt+1Ct+1 (i))]
(9)
Local stock market equilibrium The equilibrium in the local stock market depends on
investment timing. When a rm enters and establishes production in the same period as its sales
(m = 0), it asks a stock price of qt (!) = Wtf and pays a dividend of dt (!) = pt (!) yt (!) =.
Since qt (!) = dt (!) when m = 0, the stock market clears when
pt (!) yt (!)

= Wtf (10)
.
By contrast, when a rm enters and invests in the period before its sales (m = 1), it asks
a stock price of qt 1 (!) = Wt 1f and pays a dividend of dt (!) = pt (!) yt (!) =. The Euler
equation (6) becomes
Wt 1f = Et 1t 1;tpt (!) yt (!) = (11)
Product market equilibrium The above analysis shows that households make the same
choices and rms the same decisions within each country. This symmetry allows us to dispense
with household- and rm-specic notations. We can now drop the reference to i and (!; )
without any ambiguity. The product market clear when trade is balanced. The balanced trade
condition yields the exchange rate,
"t =
(1  t)PtCt
tP t Ct
; (12)
which simply compares the value of imports (numerator) to the value of exports (denominator).
Given the above relationships, we can readily determine the dividends and wages as well as the
extensive and intensive margins.
Let Nt be the mass of rms ! 2 Xt that produce in the domestic country. With the above
balanced trade condition, each domestic rms dividend is successively given by
dt =
1

ptyt =
1

t
Nt
[PtCt + "tP

t C

t ] =
1

PtCt
Nt
: (13)
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Wages, extensive and intensive margins On the one hand, consider a rm that enters
and sets its production up in the same period as its sales (m = 0). We know that dt = ptyt= =
Wtf so that the extensive and intensive margins are given by
Nt =
1

PtCt
Wtf
and yt =
Wtf
pt
= (   1) f (14)
As usual in Dixit-Stiglitz models, the intensive margin is constant while the extensive margin
absorbs all shock variability. The equilibrium labor supply is determined as follows. Consider
the wage and labor services supplied in period t+ 1. The labor market clears if
lt+1 = Nt+1`t+1 +Nt+1et+1 = Nt+1yt+1 +Nt+1f =
Pt+1Ct+1
Wt+1
where we successively used (1), (2) and (14). Plugging this value of labor supply into the wage
equation (9) yields the wage index
Wt+1 =



   1
 1
1+ h
Et (Pt+1Ct+1)
1+ 
i 1
1+ 
Ceteris paribus, the wage increases if the disutility from work increases (higher ) or their labor
services become weaker substitutes (lower ). In addition, it increases with a higher volatility
of future nominal expenditures Pt+1Ct+1 when  > 0.
On the other hand, consider a rm that enters and invests in the period before its sales
(m = 1). Then, the dividend is given by dt = ptyt= and the share price by the Euler equation
(11). The latter condition yields the extensive margin as
Nt =
Et 1t 1;tPtCt
Wt 1f
=


Pt 1Ct 1
Wt 1f
; (15)
while the former yields the intensive margin
yt =
   1

PtCt
Wt
1
Nt
: (16)
Both margins respond to shocks. In particular the extensive margin responds to the previous
periods economic condition whereas the intensive margin responds to the current conditions.
Note that the number of rms which appear as a consequence of households consumption
smoothing across time falls with more impatient investors (smaller ).
When the labor market clears, the labor supply is equal to labor demand. So, using (1),
(2), (15) and (16), we get the equilibrium labor supply as
lt+1 = Nt+1`t+1 +Nt+2et+1 = Nt+1yt+1 +Nt+2f =
   1 + 

Pt+1Ct+1
Wt+1
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Plugging this value of labor supply into the wage equation (9) yields the wage
Wt+1 =



   1
 1
1+ 

   1 + 

  
1+ h
Et (Pt+1Ct+1)
1+ 
i 1
1+ 
(17)
As above, the wage increases with higher disutility from work (higher ) and less substitutable
labor services (lower ). In addition, the wage increases with higher impatience (lower ).
This is because the extensive margin decreases, leading to a decrease in the remuneration from
setup activities. At the limit, where  ! 1, the wage coincides to that under contemporaneous
production assumption (m = 0).
Welfare The households utility is the sum of its utility from consumption and disutility
from working
URt = lnCt   
l1+ t
1 +  
;
and the utility from real money balance is
UMt =  ln
Mt
Pt
:
Following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), we assume that the latter utility can be neglected (!
0). The households consumption can be computed as
Ct = tN
(1+)t
t N
(1+)t
t

yt
t
t  yt
t
t
; (18)
where t = 1   t. This consumption level has the same expression in the contemporaneous
production model. The role of preferences for product diversity is apparent. In the absence
of love for diversity ( = 0), consumption increases with the total consumptions of domestic
and foreign varieties, Ntyt and Nt y

t . An increase in product diversity, Nt or N

t ; does not
impact household as long as it is compensated by a proportional decrease in consumption of
each variety, yt or yt . However, in the presence of love for product variety ( > 0), consumption
increases with N1+t yt or N
(1+)
t y

t so that an increase in product diversity increases welfare
even if it is compensated by the same proportional decrease in consumption.
Note that, using the equilibrium labor supply and taking the expectation of URt , the expected
work disutility (second term in URt ) is found to be constant and identical across exchange rate
regimes. What matters for welfare is the expected utility from consumption (the rst term in
URt ).
The intertemporal expected utility from consumption at period t = 0 is equal to
P1
t=0 
tE0 lnCt
where
E0 lnCt = E0t ln yt + E0

t ln y

t + (1 + ) [E0t lnNt + E0

t lnN

t ] + cst
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Using symmetry, one can simplify the latter expression to 2E0t ln yt+2 (1 + ) [E0t lnNt] +cst.
Developing those terms around expected ouput and product diversity, one further gets that the
intertemporal expected utility from consumption depends on the following expression:
E0tE0 ln yt + cov(t; ln yt) + (1 + ) [E0tE0 lnNt + cov(t; lnNt)] (19)
This expression presents the welfare impact of variations in production and product diver-
sity. The rst and second terms reect welfare e¤ect of changes in consumption of each variety
while the third term show the e¤ect of changes in product diversity. For instance, uctuations
in intensive margins yt impact expected utility through their mean and variance (rst term)
and through their covariance with demand shocks (second term). On the one hand, E0 ln yt
increases with output mean and falls with output variance.5 On the other hand, the covariance
increases with the congruence between consumerspreferences and the quantity of each product
variety supplied to the market. The same argument applies for the product diversity as uc-
tuations in extensive margins Nt also impact expected utility through their mean and variance
and through their covariance with demand shocks (third square bracket term). However, their
impact depends crucially on the presence of love for product variety, .
We now discuss the role of the timing of entry, investment and production on the choice of
exchange rate systems.
4 Contemporaneous production
Because rms repeatedly enter and exit markets, the number of product varieties - the extensive
margin - varies across time. As a result, the choice of exchange rate systems is likely to depend
on the changes in extensive margins. In this section we study a model where rms to enter
at every time period and invest and produce in the same time period. In this case, although
the economy may respond to shocks through changes in both intensive and extensive margins,
shocks are absorbed only extensive margins when exchange rates are xed.
The impact of monetary policies on output is determined as follows. As in Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005, 2009), we dene the monetary stance as t  PtCt. The monetary stance is here
derived from (4) as t = (Mt=) (1  Ett;t+1), which, after substituting for t;t+1, yields the
5For instance, one can make the following approximation for small demand shocks: E0 ln yt ' ln y  12var

yt
y

and E0 lnNt ' lnN   12var

Nt
N

@where y and N denote the steady state value of intensive and extensive
margins.@
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following recursive identity:
t =
Mt

 
1  tEt 1t+1

:
This identity solves to
t =
1

1
(1=Mt) +
P1
s=1 
sEt (1=Mt+s)
: (20)
So, the current monetary stance is a function of the current and expected future money supply.
As a result, the exchange rate can be expressed in terms of the monetary stance as
"t =
t
t
t
t
:
In the domestic country, the equilibrium wages, extensive and intensive margins are then com-
puted as (see more variables in Appendix A, Table A1)
Wt = 

Et 1
1+ 
t
 1
1+ 
; Nt =
1
f
t
Wt
and yt =
   1

t
WtNt
where
 



   1
 1
1+ 
We can make several comments from those expressions. First, wages are sticky and depend
on the expectation of the monetary stance. At given wages, extensive margins increase propor-
tionally with the monetary stance. An expansion of domestic money supply stimulates current
expenditure on consumption goods and increases local rmsprot, which triggers the entry
of new product varieties. This e¤ect is similar to the one discussed in Bergin and Corsetti
(2008). Second, the expansion of the domestic money supply also stimulates production scales
of incumbents but the latter are exactly cancelled out by the business stealing e¤ect of new
entrants. Indeed, given the above equalities, we get yt = f (   1). Third, it can be shown that
Et 1
1+ 
t
 1
1+ 
is an increasing function of  and the variance of t. Therefore, wages increase
with weaker labor supply elasticity   1 and larger variance in monetary stance when  > 0. A
larger variance in t amplies the uctuations in consumersproduct demands and therefore
rmslabor demands. This entices workers to claim higher wages in compensation for future
wage uncertainty, hence increases rmscosts. As a result of these higher wages, the number
of rms falls. However, when the labor supply is innitely elastic ( = 0), the variability of
monetary stance does not matter in wage setting behavior.
In a exible exchange rate regime, the domestic and foreign money supply (Mt;Mt ) are
constant for all time periods. The monetary stance is given as t = t = 0 where 0 is a
constant. The exchange rate becomes "t = t=t. Replacing PtCt with t = 0 in the above
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expressions, we can compute the equilibrium wage, extensive and intensive margins as
Wt = 0; Nt =
1
f
and yt = (   1) f
In this regime, not only are wages but also extensive and intensive margins constant and
independent of shock distributions. The exchange rate perfectly absorbs the e¤ects of demand
shocks on wages and margins. This is the allocation of production that would prevail in an
economy without wage rigidities.
In a xed exchange rate regime, the domestic and foreign money supply (Mt;Mt ) are set
so that the exchange rate "t equals 1. This means that monetary authorities take procyclical
monetary stances such as t = 20t and t = 20

t . Replacing PtCt by t in the above
expressions, we can compute wages, extensive and intensive margins as follows:
Wt = 20A, Nt =
1
f
t
A
and yt = (   1) f
where
A 

E0
1+ 
t
 1
1+  1=2 (21)
increases with stronger variance in t. It is shown in Appendix B that A increases from
1=2 to  as in  rises from zero to innity. The wage is higher under xed exchange rates
because workers require a risk premium to compensate their higher work time volatility. We
can make the following points from those expressions: First, wages are constant but depend on
shock distributions (through A). Wages coincide under exible and xed exchange rate regimes
when labor supply is perfectly elastic ( = 0 () A = 1=2). The wage is higher under
xed exchange rates because workers require a risk premium to compensate for labor demand
uctuations. Since Wt rises with A, wages increase with the shock variance and with the lower
labor supply elasticity (larger  ). Second, only extensive margins respond to shocks because
the business stealing e¤ect of new entrants. Higher demand for local goods triggers rm entry
under procyclical monetary policy. Finally, extensive margins fall with A. Indeed, a higher
shock variance or a lower labor supply elasticity increases wages and therefore reduces rms
incentives to enter in the market.
Compared to the exible exchange rate regime, the domestic expected welfare at t = 0
under xed exchange rates di¤ers only from its extensive margins Nt. Hence, using (19), the
condition under which a xed exchange rate regime yields a higher welfare than a exible one
is given by
(1 + ) [E0tE0 ln (t=A) + cov(t; lnt=A)] > 0 (22)
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The rst term in the bracketed term is negative represents the welfare loss under xed
exchange rates (E0 ln (t=A) = E0 lnt E0 lnA < 0). The second term is strictly positive and
measures the gains from the congruence between domestic preferences and domestic product
diversity. Because A is a constant, this term is equal to cov(t; lnt).
In expression (22), the choice of exchange rate regime is independent from the love for
variety . Only the elasticity of labor supply elasticity   1 matters through the terms A. Since
A increases in  , the above expression falls below zero as  increases from zero to innity.
Therefore there exists a unique threshold  below which (22) is positive and above which it is
negative.
Proposition 1 In the model with contemporaneous production, there exists a labor supply elas-
ticity threshold   10 such that a xed exchange rate system is preferred for labor elasticities  
 1
larger than   10 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
In this model with entry and contemporaneous production, intensive margins play no role
because demand rises are fully absorbed by new entrants. As this may lack realism, we now
discuss the model where extensive and intensive margins coexist because of production lags.
Figure 1 plots the welfare di¤erence between xed and exible exchange rates as a function
of the labor supply elasticity   1. The welfare di¤erence under contemporaneous production
is displayed with the solid blue curve. Flexible exchange rate regimes dominate when the value
on the vertical axis exceeds one. The gure shows that they are preferred for high enough labor
supply elasticities. Note that, as explained above, the choice of the regime is independent from
the values of love for variety.
This result compares with the literature on currency union where entry is xed. In par-
ticular, Devereux (2004) nds that xed exchange rate systems are supported for high enough
labor supply elasticities in a static model with perfect competition and two varieties (one pro-
duced in each country). Actually, the condition for an optimal currency union in the static
model corresponds to our condition (22) in the absence of love for variety. Hence, the extensive
margins in the present dynamic model play the same role of shock absorber as the intensive
margins in the static model. Under CES preferences, the absence of love for variety implies that
consumption uctuations Ct are functions of national products Ntyt and Nt y

t only (see (18)).
It therefore does not matter whether shocks are absorbed by intensive or extensive margins.6
6Finally, we note that our model does not have the same production and preference structure as Devereux
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Figure 1: Welfare Advantage of Currency Area
5 Lagged production
Suppose now that rms enter and invest in the period before their production. As before,
the exchange rate is a function of monetary stances, "t = (t=t)(t=

t ), which allows us to
compute the following equilibrium wages, extensive and intensive margins
Wt = 

Et 1
1+ 
t
 1
1+ 
; Nt+1 =

f
t
Wt
and yt =
   1

t
WtNt
;
where
 

   1 + 

  
1+ 
is a constant (see other variables in Appendix A, Table A2). The expansion of monetary stance
boosts the current nominal expenditures and therefore the current incumbent rmsrevenues
and consumersincentives to save. On the one hand, this expands the incumbent rmscurrent
production scale, yt. On the other hand, it also increases rmsdiscounted expected operational
prots above the entry costs, which remains unchanged because of wage stickiness. As a result,
more rms enter with the perspective to produce in the next period. Because entrants do not
produce at the same time as incumbents, there is no business stealing e¤ect following current
because it includes xed inputs in each period and a continuum of product varieties. To be comparable the
static model should include those features. It can be shown that the condition for an optimal currency area
remains the same as Devereuxonly in the particular case where product diversity Nt and/or xed input f tend
to zero.
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demand shocks.
In the exible exchange rate regime, the domestic and foreign money supply are constant
for all time periods so that the monetary stance is again t = t = 0 and the exchange rate
is equal to "t = t=t. Replacing PtCt by t = 0 in the above expressions, we get
Wt = 0, Nt =

f
and yt = (   1) f

:
As in the contemporaneous production model, the exchange rate perfectly absorbs the e¤ects
of demand shocks on wages and margins so that margins remain constant.
In the xed exchange rate regime, the domestic and foreign money supplies are set to
maintain a xed exchange rate "t = 1. Monetary stances are procyclical and then equal to
t = 20t and t = 20

t . Replacing PtCt by t in the above expressions, the wages, the
equilibrium extensive and intensive margins are computed as follows:
Wt = 20A, Nt+1 =

f
t
A
and yt = (   1) f

t
t 1
As before, wages rise with the higher variance of the shocks (larger A) and lower elasticity of
labor supply (larger  ). Contrary to the contemporaneous production model, both the extensive
and intensive margins here respond to shocks under xed exchange rate regimes. The future
extensive margins vary with current period shocks due to the procyclical feature of monetary
policy. The intensive margins adapt to both the current and previous period demand shocks.
They rise with the current shock, t; because of the pro-active monetary policy and fall with
the past demand shock, t 1; because of the past monetary policy that boosted rmsentry.
We can now compare welfare under the two regimes. Welfare di¤erences stem from both
extensive and intensive margins. Hence, using (19), the xed exchange rate regime supporting
condition is given by
E0tE0 ln
t
t 1
+ cov(t; ln
t
t 1
) + (1 + ) [E0tE0 ln (t 1=A) + cov(t; lnt 1)] > 0:
The rst term reects the impact of the mean and variance of intensive margins. Since
E0 lnt= (t 1) = E0 lnt E0 lnt 1 = 0 and since shocks are i.i.d, this term is nil. The second
termmeasures the congruence of current preferences and supply of each domestic product. With
i.i.d. shocks, this term simplies to cov(t; lnt) > 0, which reects the benet of a congruence
between preferences and product supplies under xed exchange rate regimes. The last square
bracket expresses the same trade-o¤ as in the case of contemporaneous production. The rst
term is the mean and variance e¤ect of extensive margins. This is a loss that is weakened
by a higher labor supply elasticity (larger   1) through a lower A. Since demand shocks are
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i.i.d., the second term in the bracket is nil. Past movements in rm entry and exit, hence the
resulting uctuations in product diversity, cannot be related to present preferences and do not
bring any congruence benet.
The above condition simplies to
(1 + ) [E0tE0 ln (t 1=A)] + cov(t; lnt) > 0 (23)
which decreases in A and therefore in  . By the same argument as for Proposition 1, the
expression (23) accepts a unique root  1. Since expression (23) is smaller than (22) by the
term cov(t; lnt=A) > 0, which increases in , this root  1 is smaller than  0 and that
increases with larger . The roots are identical in the absence of love for variety ( = 0).
Proposition 2 In a model with lagged production, there exists a labor supply elasticity threshold
  11 such that a xed exchange rate system is preferred for  
 1 >   11 . The threshold  
 1
1 is
larger than   10 and falls as love for product diversity  rises.
To illustrate the proposition, the colored curves in Figure 1 display the welfare di¤erence
between the exchange rate regimes with lagged production. The red and green curve shows this
di¤erence respectively when the parameter for love for variety takes the Dixit-Stiglitzvalue,
 = 1=(  1) and when it takes the half of this value. The second value roughly approximates
Ardeleans (2006) estimate of  about 42% of 1=(  1). As stated above, the black curve here
corresponds to the case where  = 0. We set the elasticity of product substitution  to 3:8
according to Bernard et al. (2003), which gives the parameters  2 f0; 0:18; 0:36g. At a given
labor supply elasticity, xed exchange rate regime becomes harder to support when the love for
product variety rises.
Accordingly, a xed exchange rate system is less likely to be supported when production lags
behind entry and investment. The reason is however not trivial because production lags change
the nature of the costs and benets of exchange rate systems. Indeed, in this lagged production
model, a xed exchange rate system can improve welfare because the better congruence between
preferences and product supplies outweighs the cost of higher variance in extensive margins.
By contrast, in the contemporaneous production model, a xed exchange rate system improves
welfare when the better congruence between preferences and product diversity outweigh the
cost of higher volatility in product diversity.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of intensive and extensive margins on the choice of xed or exible
exchange rate regimes. The literature has focused on how exchange rates and intensive margin
absorb macro-economic shocks and mitigate production and employment volatility. The present
paper discusses the relevance of extensive margins as shock absorbers. In a rst contempora-
neous production model where entry and investment take place in the same time period, we
show that intensive margins do not uctuate and that only extensive margins vary following
a demand shock in xed exchange rate regimes. The choice for a xed exchange rate regime
then results from the balance between the cost of a lower level and a higher variance of product
diversity and the benet of the better congruence between preferences and product diversity.
Fixed exchange rate regimes are preferred for high enough labor supply elasticities because
more exible labor supplies represents better shock absorbers. We then discuss the same model
where production lags behind entry. In this case, both intensive and extensive margins may
uctuate. More particularly, extensive margins under xed exchange rates have a negative
contribution to welfare because they lead to low level and a high volatility of product diversity.
However, intensive margins bring a positive welfare contribution because they align consump-
tion with preferences. Fixed exchange rate regimes are then less likely to be supported when
production lags exist. They also perform worse when consumers express a higher preference for
product diversity.
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Appendix A: Optimal choice of households
The problem can be stated in terms of the following optimization of the Lagrangian function
L0 (i):
E0
1X
t=0
tfUt + t(i)[wt(i)lt(i) +
Z
!2Xt
st m (i; !) dt (!) d! +Mt 1(i)
  PtCt (i) 
Z
!2Xt+m
st (i; !) qt (!) d!  Mt]g
with respect to fxt (i; !) ; zt (j; ) ;Mt (i) ; st (i; !) ; wt(i)g1t=0 where t(i) denotes the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with the ow budget constraint at time t. Note that PtCt (i) =
R
!2Xt pt (!)xt (i; !)d!+R
2Zt pt () zt (i; )d.
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The rst order condition with respect to Ct (i) yields
1
Ct (i)
  t(i)Pt = 0 (24)
So, t(i) represents the marginal utility stemming from one additional unit of nominal wealth.
The above expression is identical for both models with m = 0; 1.
The rst order condition with respect to Mt (i) yields

Mt (i)
  t(i) + Ett+1(i) = 0 (25)
The rst order condition with respect to st (i; !) gives
 t(i)qt (!) + Etdt+1 (!)t+1(i) = 0
The marginal utility of nominal wealth at t is equal to the discounted marginal utility at t+ 1.
This condition is redundant when m = 0.
The household also sets the future wage wt+1(i) at t knowing the demand function for her
labor service lt+1 (i). The rst order condition with respect to wt+1(i) yields

Etlt+1 (i)
1+ 
wt+1 (i)
  (   1)Et [t+1(i)lt+1 (i)] = 0
Accordingly, the expected disutility of a marginal work e¤ort is equal to the expected consump-
tion utility of the associated marginal wage increase.
We can summarize the solutions for the contemporenous and lagged production models
m = 0; 1 for any exchange rate in the following tables:
Home variables Foreign variables
Ct = tt C

t = (1  t) t
t  N (1+)tt N(1+)(1 t)t

yt
t
t  yt
1 t
1 t
"t =
1 t
t
t
t
lt =
t
Wt
lt =
t
W t
Nt =
1

t
Wtf
Nt =
1

t
W t f
yt =
 1

t
WtNt
= (   1) f yt =  1 

t
W t Nt
= (   1) f 
pt =

 1Wt p

t =

 1W

t
dt =
1

t
Nt
dt =
1

t
Nt
qt = Wtf q

t = W

t f

Wt = 

Et 1
1+ 
t
 1
1+ 
W t = 

Et 1
1+ 
t
 1
1+ 
t = PtCt 

t = P

t C

t
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Table A1: Solution in contemporenous entry model (m = 0)
Home variables Foreign variables
Ct = tt C

t = (1  t) t
t  N (1+)tt N(1+)(1 t)t

yt
t
t  yt
1 t
1 t
"t =
1 t
t
t
t
lt =
 
 1+


t
Wt
lt =
 
 1+

 t
W t
Nt =


t 1
Wt 1f
Nt =


t 1
W t 1f
yt =
 1

t
WtNt
yt =
 1

t
W t Nt
pt =

 1Wt p

t =

 1W

t
dt =
1

t
Nt
dt =
1

t
Nt
qt = Wtf q

t = W

t f

Wt = 

Et 1
1+ 
t
 1
1+ 
W t = 

Et 1
1+ 
t
 1
1+ 
t = PtCt 

t = P

t C

t
Table A2: Solution in lagged production model (m = 1)
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) We need to show that A is an increasing function of  and is negative for large  . Let
G : [1   ; ] ! [0; 1] be the cumulative distribution of t where  2 [1=2; 1] is the up-
per bound of the distribution. We rst show that dA=d > 0. Indeed, let f( )  A1+ =R
1+ dG(), which is lower than one because t < 1 for all t and is an increasing function as
f 0( ) = (1 +  )
R
 dG() > 0. Then, we compute that d lnA=d = (d=d )

ln f( )1=(1+ )

=
(d=d ) [(1 +  ) 1 ln f( )] =  (1 +  ) 2 ln f( ) + (1 +  ) 1f 0( )=f( ), which is positive be-
cause each term is positive in the last expression. Since d lnA=d = A 1dA=d , it must be that
dA=d > 0. Second, expanding the covariance term, the bracket in expression (22) is equal to
E0tE0 lnt   E0tE0 lnA + E0t lnt   E0tE0 lnt, which simplies to E0t (lnt   lnA).
The latter expression is negative because lnt < lnA = ln for  ! 1. Indeed, we
successively get lim !1 lnA = lim !1 ln

E0
1+ 
 1
1+ = lim !1 ln
hR 
1  
1+ dG()
i 1
1+ 
=
lim !1 ln
hR 
1  (=)
1+ 1+ dG(t)
i 1
1+ 
. Since lim !1 (t=t)
1+ = 0 for any t < t, the
latter expression becomes lim !1 ln

1+ g()
 1
1+ = ln+ lim !1 [1= (1 +  )] ln g() = ln.
(ii) We need to show that E0t ln (t=E0t) > 0. Indeed, this equivalent to E02t ln 2t >
0. Since x  ln (1 + x)  x   x2=2, we get 2t (2t   1)  2t ln 2t  2t (2t   1)  
2t (2t   1)2 =2. The LHS of those conditions can be written as (2t   1)2 + (2t   1),
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which expected value is E0 (2t   1)2 = 4var(t). The RHS can be written as (2t   1)2 +
(2t   1)   (2t   1)3 =2   (2t   1)2 =2, which expected value is E0 (2t   1)2 =2 = 2var(t)
because E0 (2t   1)3 = 0 for any symmetric distribution of shock t. Then, 4var(t) 
E02t ln 2t  2var(t), so that E02t ln 2t > 0.
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